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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THIS COURT CAN REVIEW ALL OF THE INSUFFICIENCY CLAIMS 
BECAUSE THEY ARE ALL PRESERVED, THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENTLY 
MARSHALED, AND THE EVIDENCE IS STILL INSUFFICIENT 
A. Justification for review was sufficiently argued. 
The State argues that two of the three claims were either not preserved or there 
was no justification for review. The two claims allegedly not preserved were those 
arguing plain error that specific elements of the crime had not been met sufficiently by 
the direct and circumstantial evidence provided at trial. 
The State is incorrect in its argument because, "To affirm the jury's verdict, we 
must be sure the State has introduced evidence sufficient to support all elements of the 
charged crime/' State v. Gonzales, 2 P. 3d 954, 957 (Utah App. 2000). Internal 
quotations and alterations omitted. The two claims of plain error in the insufficiency of 
evidence are precisely the kinds of justification for review that this Court needs. State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). These "plain error" justifications are the 
basis for exceptions to the preservation rule, which were mentioned in the original brief. 
State v. Pinder. 2005 UT 15, If 45, 114 P.3d 551 and Br. Appellant at 6-7, 37-39, 42. 
Further, the appellate rules about inadequate briefing were not violated because the 
Defendant amply cited to the record where the evidence was or was not and indicated 
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where the result was made: in the jury's decision. E.g. Br. Appellant at 9-17. The State's 
arguments in sections IA (pages 8-9) of its brief are incorrect. 
B. The evidence that was marshaled, together with the State's quotations, 
demonstrate that the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt was clearly not 
met. 
The State argues that the Defendant failed to marshal the evidence properly. 
While it is true that the State mentioned evidence that the Defendant did not cite in his 
brief, the marshaling requirement does not mean that the Defendant must amass the 
evidence exactly how the State would. If so, the State would not have to respond. The 
adequately marshaled evidence is so in favor of the Defendant that the State's only 
recourse is to claim that the Defendant failed to marshal the evidence for them. 
The marshaled evidence demonstrates that there were facts that would make a 
reasonable person believe a crime had been committed by the Defendant. The State has 
pointed them out well and many of them were in the Defendant's brief, as well. When 
those facts were more carefully analyzed at trial, however, they failed to establish that all 
the elements of the alleged crime had been met by the highest level of certainty that 
American courts require. Instead, the marshaled facts established that there was clearly 
enough room to reasonably doubt that the Defendant was guilty, as pointed out in the 
Defendant's brief. Br. Appellant at 19-23, 25-27, 30, 32-35, 39-40. There was not 
enough evidence to know beyond a reasonable doubt. Even in the light most favorable to 
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the verdict, the marshaled evidence was "sufficiently inconclusive...[for] reasonable 
minds," such that the jurors "must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Buck, 2009 UT App 2, <|[9, 
200 P.32 674. The State's arguments in IB (pages 10-11) of their brief are, therefore, 
incorrect. 
C. The evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding Defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The marshaled evidence did not demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
Defendant possessed methamphetamine. Not only did it fail to show possession, but it 
also failed significantly to show that the Defendant ever had any prohibited "intent" 
towards the residue and paraphernalia discovered for the mens rea or for constructive 
possession. State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 131-32 (Utah 1987) ("To find that a 
defendant had constructive possession...it is necessary to prove that...the accused 
had...the intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug. Whether there is a 
sufficient nexus depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case."). Accordingly, 
the marshaled evidence also failed to show even constructive possession because the 
Defendant was found initially unconscious with the contraband and neither showing signs 
nor producing evidence that the sleep was due to any legal or illegal drug. (R434:112, 
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166, 178, 286). The evidence was not there. Only speculative conclusions arising from 
the low level of certainty standard—belief—provided for the jury's decision of guilt. 
The marshaled evidence showed no difference between the Defendant, who was 
found apparently sleeping (R434:112, 166, 178, 286), and an "incidental bystander" 
(Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125, 130 (D.C. 2001)) because multiple people were in 
and out of the garage area when the Defendant was not there (R434:259-260, 266, 270-1, 
276, 284), who could have easily disposed of the paraphernalia in the unlocked 
(R434:184, 263, 271) trailer or office (R434:149-150, 199, 205, 257, 261, 275, 281, 283) 
where the general public would not see it, and where the Defendant would not find it 
quickly since he "didn't go out there very often." R434:281. It is difficult to have a 
present intent to exercise control over anything while unconscious, yet, that is what the 
State unreasonably claims is showed by the evidence. 
Significantly, no "sufficient" direct "nexus" can be shown by the "facts or 
circumstances." See State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 131-32 (Utah 1987). There was not 
even a single fingerprint of the Defendant's on the glass of the paraphernalia; there was, 
however, one from another individual (R434: 147-148). Significantly, there was no urine 
sample evidence showing consumption of the illegal drug discovered. R434: 151-152, 
164, 178, 241-243, 246-253, 302. The strongest piece of evidence is that one of the 
contraband items was within "arm's reach" (R434:109-10) of the Defendant, but that 
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evidence does not amount to much when the contraband is not within a conscious arm's 
reach. And simply being near the contraband while conscious is not even enough: 
The mere occupancy of a portion of the premises where the drug is found 
cannot, without more, support a finding of its knowing and intentional 
possession by the accused. There must be some additional nexus between 
the accused and the contraband to show that the accused had the power and 
intent to exercise dominion and control over it. 
State v. Hansen, 732 P. 2d 127, 132 (Utah 1987) citing State v. Fox, 709 
P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985); State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1263 (Utah 
1983) (Durham, J., concurring opinion with two justices concurring); State 
v. Carlson, 635 P.2d at 74. Accord People v. Theobald, 231 Cal. App.2d 
351, 41 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1964); Petty v. People, 167 Colo. 240, 447 P.2d 217 
(1968); Glispey v. Sheriff, Carson City, 89 Nev. 221, 510 P.2d 623 (1973); 
State v. Herrera, 90 N.M. 306, 563 P.2d 100 (N.M.Ct.App.), cert, denied, 
Herrara v. State, 90 N.M. 636, 567 P.2d 485 (1977); Champeau v. State, 
678 P.2d 1192 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); Brown v. State, 481 P.2d 475 
(Okl.Crim. App. 1971); State v. Hystad, 36 Wash. App. 42, 671 P.2d 793 
(1983); State v. Davis, 16 Wash. App. 657, 558 P.2d 263, 264 (1977). 
The "nexus" that the State claims exists is clearly not "sufficient" (Id.) because it is far 
too attenuated to eliminate all reasonable doubts of guilt and prove culpability because it 
is only based on temporal proximity to the contraband in his open trailer and nothing 
more. 
The State makes the same logical fallacy as the jury members. It states, "the 
evidence showed that the light bulbs had been altered...into a pipe...[and] could not be 
used for their normal purposes," that the bulbs had "burned residue" that turned out to be 
"methamphetamine," and that based solely on this that the Defendant must have done it 
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as opposed to anyone else. Br. Appellee at 17. No evidence established, however, that 
the Defendant had any particular skills in altering bulbs into pipes. No evidence showed 
that he had ever done it before. No evidence showed that he had ever consumed 
methamphetamine. No evidence showed that he even knew how to burn 
methamphetamine into residue on the bulbs. No evidence showed that he even owned 
the same brand of light bulbs. No evidence showed that he even had the tools that could 
alter the bulbs. The marshaled evidence did not even tell us when the person who altered 
the bulbs may have done it. R434: 236-237. Absolutely no uniquely identifying 
evidence was presented that showed the Defendant did any of these things, and yet, the 
State says, "From this evidence [about the alteration of the bulbs], the jury could 
reasonably have inferred that Defendant possessed the light bulbs with the intent that they 
be used to introduce drugs into the human body.9' Br. Appellee at 17. That evidence 
alone does not reasonably tell us anything about who did it except that a human being did 
it (not necessarily a male or female), who could do it, who knew how to do it, and who 
did not accidently do it. Beyond that, no identifying evidence whatsoever created any 
sufficient nexus or link between the Defendant and this kind of handiwork. 
The State's arguments in IC (pages 12-29) of their brief are, therefore, incorrect. 
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II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID ERR WHEN REJECTING THE PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTION REQUIRING THE JURY TO ELIMINATE ALL REASONABLE 
ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES OF GUILT 
Under the circumstances of this case, where the proof was so heavily dependent on 
circumstantial evidence and where the State failed to show any direct nexus between the 
Defendant and the incriminating evidence by way of fingerprints, DNA, consumption, 
impaired behavior, history or modus operandi of making methamphetamine 
paraphernalia, or habitually using any methamphetamine, it was appropriate and 
necessary to inform the jury that the State was required to preclude every reasonable 
hypotheses of innocence that provided reasonable doubt about the Defendant's guilt. 
Otherwise, the trial court condones a jury verdict that still entertains reasonable doubt. 
The Defendant does not argue that the jury cannot weigh the evidence and draw 
reasonable inferences. He merely and emphatically argues that the State failed to instruct 
the jury sufficiently under the set of facts presented to them because that evidence failed 
to prove without doubt who was the one or ones who altered the bulbs and consumed the 
illicit drugs. The State merely tried to prove guilt by association in a general sense—that 
the Defendant was associated with his open business location that contained used 
paraphernalia at the time he was asleep inside it. Taken in the broad sense, "Conviction 
thus cannot be had on the basis of...guilt by association." State v. Murphy, 674 P. 2d 
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12205 1224 (Utah 1983). The mere guilt by association evidence presented at trial, which 
lacked no specifically identifying features linking it to the Defendant, without the 
stronger jury instruction in this instance, facilitated the prejudicial effects that guilt by 
association can bring. The broad use of "guilt by association" is not merely guilt by 
association with incriminating evidence, it is guilt by association with the unknown 
criminal who made the altered bulbs, left his fingerprint on one of them, and then put 
them out of view of the general public in the unlocked trailer. Association by sleeping in 
the same place where such a person deposited them engenders substantially unfair 
prejudice requiring the jury instructions about eliminating all reasonable alternative 
hypothesis of guilt. The State's arguments in section II (pages 29-33) of their brief are, 
therefore, incorrect. The verdict should be set aside and appropriate orders entered. 
III. 
THE DEFENDANT DID NOT INVITE ANY ERROR IN REGARDS TO THE 
LOST URINE SAMPLE 
There is no single standard for determining whether the prosecution's withholding 
of exculpatory evidence violates due process. A different standard applies in each of three 
separate circumstances. The urine sample that was withheld in this case had the real 
possibility of being mitigating or exculpatory evidence. The State failed to even test the 
30 cubic centimeters (cc's) of urine that it had in its possession. R126, R434:152. The 
only apparent reason the State did not test the 30 cc's was because the Defendant could 
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not do DNA testing of it on his own. R78-79. He requested it, but it was not enough. 
There was nothing stopping the State, however, from testing their 30 cc's sample. 
Two of the three standards can apply in this case in regards to the withheld urine 
sample. "The second circumstance is where the defense makes a pretrial request for 
specific evidence which would tend to exculpate the defendant or reduce the penalty." 
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P. 2d 1101 (Utah 1983). In the second circumstance, the courts 
have said, "[I]t is reasonable to require the prosecutor to respond either by furnishing the 
information or by submitting the problem to the trial judge." Id. quoting United States v. 
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2398 (1976). The failure to make any response 
whatever would be "a violation of due process." Id. at 1106, quoting Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196 (1963). In this case, the Defendant, through 
counsel, requested the urine sample (R78-79), but instead of submitting the problem to 
the trial judge, the State did nothing. Accordingly, the State violated the Defendant's due 
process rights. 
In the third instance, the Defendant claims denial of due process from the State 
failing to volunteer the exculpatory evidence: 
[I]f the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise 
exist, constitutional error has been committed. This means that the omission 
must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is no 
reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the additional evidence is 
considered, there is no justification for a new trial. On the other hand, if the 
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verdict is already of questionable validity, additional evidence of relatively 
minor importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt. 
Id at 1106, quoting 427 U.S. at 112-13, 96 S.Ct. at 2401-2402. 
A prosecutor violates due process under this third circumstance if he fails to reveal 
voluntarily evidence which, viewed in the context of the entire record, creates a 
reasonable doubt about Defendant's guilt. Here, the verdict is already of questionable 
validity because of the lack of uniquely identifying pieces of evidence creating a nexus 
between the Defendant and the paraphernalia. As such, the urine sample would have 
clearly been sufficient to create reasonable doubt if it tested negative for 
methamphetamine. 
If the urine sample tested positive for methamphetamine, then the State would 
have a direct, uniquely identifying piece of evidence clearly linking the Defendant to the 
paraphernalia and residue found in his trailer office. The nexus would have been 
established. The case would have been open and shut in favor of the State. If it did not, 
then it would be extraordinarily useful to the Defendant as mitigating or exculpatory 
evidence of guilt. 
Whether it was for or against the Defendant, the evidence the State had was 
incalculably valuable. Yet it did nothing with it. It did not voluntarily offer it. The lack 
of analysis on such an important piece of evidence smacks of impropriety on the level of 
Constitutional due process violations. The Defendant's supposed consent at trial to 
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stipulate to its loss (B. Appellee at 36) was tainted by the plain error impropriety of 
waiving his right to potentially exculpatory evidence. The Defendant himself should 
have been the one who consented to the stipulated waiver (State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 
353, 356 (Utah 1980) (fundamental constitutional right to due process may be waived 
knowingly and voluntarily only)); however, the trial court accepted his attorney's 
stipulation to waive such an important Constitutional right when the Defendant had never 
been informed of the gravity of the right that was being waived for him. 
The Defendant James Crabb, therefore, did not invite any error. The trial court 
invited the error by not asking him if he was "voluntarily and intelligently" waiving his 
due process rights to potentially exculpatory evidence. 
Had Mr. Crabb been given the chance, and had he not waived his right, then the 
trial court would have had to either order it tested or tell the jury to presume it had 
already tested negative for methamphetamine. The outcome of the case would very 
likely have been more favorable to the Defendant. These meet the requirements of the 
plain error doctrine and avoid the realization of the invited error doctrine. State v. Dunn, 
850 P. 2d 1201, 1208-1209 (Utah 1993). The State's arguments in section III (pages 34-
44) of their brief are incorrect. On the basis of plain error, therefore, this Court can set 
aside the conviction and make appropriate orders. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court can review all of the claims of the Defendant/Appellant because there are 
proper justifications for those claims not preserved at trial and the evidence has been sufficiently 
marshaled. The marshaled evidence demonstrates that it was insufficient to meet the elements of 
the crimes charged by a standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt for each element. The 
strongest piece of evidence tying the Defendant/Appellant to the paraphernalia was his proximity 
to it. Courts have clearly stated that more is required to establish with proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the Defendant/Appellant intended to use the contraband. With such a lack of 
evidence, the trial court should have instructed the jury to eliminate all reasonable alternative 
hypothesis of guilt. The Defendant/Appellant did not invite any error in the withholding of the 
urine sample because he never waived his right to the potentially exculpatory evidence. The trial 
court committed plain error in allowing the Defendant/Appellant's attorney to waive his right to 
that evidence, violating the Defendant's due process rights. 
Dated this 27th day of June 2011. 
Taylor C. Hartley 
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